When leaders from 53 countries convene at the second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul this March, they will review the substantial progress that has been made in securing nuclear weapons and materials worldwide since the inaugural summit in Washington two years ago, as well as what still remains to be done.
On the one hand, there can be no question that by focusing like a laser beam on the issue of securing nuclear weapons and materials beyond the reach of thieves and terrorists, persuading participants in the 2010 Summit to pledge that by 2014 all such materials will be either secured or eliminated, and working with states case-by-case to consolidate, secure, and indeed eliminate weapons-usable material, this effort has made the world a safer place. On the other, despite many notable advances and a laudable boost in general awareness of the problem, too many weapons and too much material remain at risk. The pace of preventative actions taken does not yet match the threat. Securing all weapons and materials is an immense political and logistical challenge. But the consequences of failing to do so could be truly catastrophic. The Seoul summit will play an indispensable role in moving governments to address this challenge with the vigor it demands.
The international community has faced similar challenges before, perhaps ones even more daunting. To stretch our imagination about what can conceivably be done, and provide some historical perspective on the task remaining before us, it may be instructive Twenty years ago Russia and fourteen other newly-independent states emerged from the ruins of the Soviet empire, many as nations for the first time in history. As is typical in the aftermath of the collapse of an empire, this was followed by a period of chaos, confusion, and corruption. As the saying went at the time, "everything is for sale." At that same moment, as the Soviet state imploded, 35,000 nuclear weapons remained at thousands of sites across a vast Eurasian landmass that stretched across eleven time zones.
Today, fourteen of the fifteen successor states to the Soviet Union are nuclear weaponsfree. When the U.S.S.R. disappeared, 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads remained in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, most of them atop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that stood on alert, ready to be fired at targets in the U.S. Today, every one of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus has been deactivated and returned to Russia, where they were dismantled and the nuclear material in the warheads blended down to produce fuel for civilian reactors.
Strategic nuclear weapons are nuclear warheads aimed at an adversary's nuclear weapons, cities and military infrastructure. Typically, they are large in yield and heavy.
Of greater interest to terrorists, however, were the former U.S.S.R's 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons with smaller yields and shorter ranges. These were designed primarily for battlefield use, with some small enough to fit into a duffel bag. Today, all of these have also been returned to Russia, leaving zero nuclear weapons in any other state of the former Soviet Union. consider what clues we can extract from the success in denuclearizing fourteen postSoviet states that can inform our non-proliferation and nuclear security efforts in the future. These clues may inform leaders of the U.S., Russia, and other responsible nations attending the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit on March 26-27, 2012. The paper will conclude with specific recommendations, some exceedingly ambitious that world leaders could follow to build on the Seoul summit's achievements against nuclear terrorism in the period before the next summit in 2014. One of these would be to establish a Global Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.
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THE SETTING
As fate would have it, I was in Moscow in August 1991 when a group of conservatives in the Soviet security establishment attempted to overthrow President Mikhail Gorbachev.
Tanks commanded by the plotters ringed the Kremlin; Gorbachev, then on vacation in the southern part of the country, was placed under house arrest. With a longtime Russian friend, Andrei Kokoshin, later the national security advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, I inspected the tank battalion and other military units surrounding the Kremlin and elsewhere in Moscow. As we walked and talked, it became clear to both of us that the coup would fail and that the Soviet superpower was soon to be no more.
On the plane back to the U.S., I wrote a private memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time, Colin Powell, with whom I had worked in the Reagan administration. Entitled "Sounding the Alarm," that memo stated: "Soviet disunion could create additional nuclear states, provoke struggles for control of Soviet nuclear weapons, and lead to a loss of control of strategic or non-strategic nuclear weapons." Since these events are now history, and the memo was private but not classified, it is attached here as appendix.
Could the newly-independent former Soviet states, having been dominated by Russia for centuries, be persuaded to give up the nuclear weapons within their borders? To many of them, a nuclear deterrent appeared to be the best guarantor of independent survival and security. Fatalists dismissed the proposal to eliminate these arsenals as a fool's errand.
Nonetheless, as a result of a bold strategy that defined a bright red line of zero nuclear weapons in these states, established deep U.S.-Russian cooperation, and carefully employed the full array of carrots and sticks, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus each agreed in 1994 to eliminate all nuclear weapons on their soil. By the end of 1996, every one of the 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads in these states had been deactivated and returned to Russia. In addition, 14,000 Soviet tactical nuclear warheads that had been deployed outside Russia were returned, and many of them dismantled. In what was not only a strategic, but also a logistical triumph, Russian military and security services managed to maintain control of tactical warheads, to load them onto trucks, trains, and aircraft, and to return them to secure storage sites in Russia. As a former DHL executive observed, this would have been an extremely demanding assignment even for the "world's leading package delivery service," let alone for a state apparatus beset by organizational crises.
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STEP-BY-STEP: WHAT HAPPENED TO SOVIET NUKES?
The collapse of the former Soviet Union presented policy-makers with three unique nuclear challenges. The first was to address the fact that Soviet strategic nuclear weapons -principally its nuclear-armed ICBMs -were located in four of the Soviet successor states, raising the prospect that the demise of the Soviet Union would result in the emergence of several states with intercontinental nuclear arsenals. The second was to secure and consolidate the Soviet Union's far-flung arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, the type that would be most transportable to a terrorist group or rogue state in search of an instant nuclear capability. The third was to prevent the theft of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material from Russia, or elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.
Strategic Nuclear Arsenal
Competition for ownership and control of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces posed the most urgent challenge. When the U.S.S.R. collapsed, the former Soviet strategic arsenal was left in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as well as in Russia.
President George H.W. Bush had no problem identifying the best feasible outcome for the U.S.: a single nuclear successor state, Russia. Russia's national security establishment strongly agreed.
Numerous obstacles lay between American and Russian preferences and their realization, particularly in the case of Ukraine. Belarus was a much less serious concern because of its subservience to Moscow. Kazakhstan wavered only briefly before the pragmatic policies of President Nursultan Nazarbayev set his republic firmly on a course toward total denuclearization, a status it achieved when the last nuclear warhead was removed from Kazakh territory in April 1995.
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What Happened to the Soviet Superpower's Nuclear Arsenal? Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit Ukraine, however, had a simple and intuitively compelling reason for wanting to retain a minimal nuclear deterrent: to assure its independence from Russia. As Ukraine's thenDefense Minister Konstantin Morozov, a key player in the negotiations that ended in the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, put it plainly: "Ukraine would have posed no threat to anyone if, hypothetically speaking, it had possessed tactical nuclear weapons.
Such weapons could have deterred Russia in its unfriendly political and economic lunges at Ukraine." 1 Moreover, thoughtful American voices counseled Ukrainians that the best possible guarantor of that independence lay in an independent nuclear deterrent. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski (President Carter's national security advisor), the Clinton administration's focus on Ukraine's nuclear status was misplaced.
2 In reality, Brzezinski argued, the continued strength of Russia's age-old "imperial impulse" necessitated that the U.S. recognize "the fact that Ukraine's independent existence is a matter of far greater long-range significance than whether Kiev does or does not promptly dismantle its post- Those of us at the Defense Department were acutely aware of the possibility that a contest for control of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, or an attack upon them, could trigger an accidental launch of warheads that would destroy American cities. The vaunted SS24s carried ten independently targeted warheads with a yield of 550 kilotons each, all aimed at American targets.
Thus, the message from the U.S. Department of Defense to Ukrainian Minister of Defense Morozov, the Ukrainian national security advisor, and Ukraine's president was that the nuclear arsenal in Ukraine threatened American national security. On repeated occasions, as Assistant Secretary, I told Ukrainian counterparts that if I were an advisor to the Russian General Staff and concluded that Ukraine was about to take operational control of nuclear-armed ICBMs, I would advise attacking the weapons and facilities to prevent that outcome.
Second, U.S. strategy sought to persuade Ukraine's leaders that its best hope for survival in a dangerous world, especially since it shared a long, yet undetermined border with a 9
What Happened to the Soviet Superpower's Nuclear Arsenal? Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit wounded bear that had for the previous millennium dominated Kiev, lay in establishing a real relationship with the U.S.. As the sole remaining superpower, the U.S. was unambiguously number one. Washington was, we told the new leaders of Ukraine, prepared to enhance military-to-military relations with a non-nuclear Ukraine. As the world's economic superpower, the U.S. was also the gatekeeper to the economic and technical assistance Ukraine sorely needed from the World Bank and the IMF. U.S.
assistance to Ukraine would be conditioned on their elimination of nuclear weapons.
Third, U.S. strategy underscored for Ukrainians the real dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Just seven years earlier, Ukraine had experienced the nightmare of Chernobyl.
A civilian nuclear power plant had melted down, releasing highly radioactive material across a large swathe of Ukraine and Belarus. Every new member of the Ukrainian government and military had a personal story about the devastating consequences of that tragedy. Earlier, as a member in a Harvard project that provided economic and political advice to the emerging government in Kiev, I had created the first bumper sticker for the newly independent Ukraine. It warned in both Russian and Ukrainian: "Every nuclear weapon is a Chernobyl just about to happen."
As negotiations over the nuclear weapons dragged on, and evidence of Ukraine's seriousness about taking operational control of nuclear weapons mounted, Russian negotiators struck a responsive chord by arguing that the weapons in Ukraine had passed their "service warranty" and were at risk of leaking radiation or even exploding. The U.S.
did nothing to deflate such exaggeration. Morozov, Ukraine's then-Defense Minister, believes to this day that Ukraine could not have ensured the safe operation of nuclear weapons on its territory. According to Morozov, Ukraine had "no technological capacity for ensuring safe operation of nuclear weapons." In fact, when asked to name the top three reasons why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons, Morozov cited (1) the unpredictable consequences that the Ukrainian government would have had to face if it had decided to claim command and control of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine; (2) the lack of technical preparations that would have been needed to take over their maintenance and 
Tactical Nuclear Arsenals
The total size of the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons arsenal remains unknown.
According to best estimates, however, at least 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons were stationed across the Soviet Union's fifteen constituent republics in 1991. In the context of increasing turmoil within the ranks of the Soviet military and rising instability along the Soviet periphery, especially in the conflict-ridden republics such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan, the Soviet Union's tactical nuclear weapons arsenal presented an acute risk. If stolen and offered for sale in international arms bazaars, there would have been many eager buyers, including not only rogue states but also terrorist groups. We sometimes referred to these hypothetical "loose nukes" as "Cheney's 250."
Recognizing this risk, the U.S. and Russian governments undertook a series of initiatives in the early 1990s to reduce their arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons. Later dubbed "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNIs), these were "reciprocal unilateral commitments," which meant that they were unilateral, not legally binding and reversible, calling for an appropriate but voluntary response. 
Nuclear Theft
The third nuclear challenge of the post-Soviet era was qualitatively different and orders of magnitude more difficult than the first two. Solutions to the first two problems succeeded in concentrating the former Soviet nuclear arsenal within Russia.
The good news: all nuclear weapons had been retrieved from the fragile former Soviet states. The bad news: the weapons were returned to Russia during a period of considerable chaos. Thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of thousands of pounds of weapons-usable fissile material were being held at scores of sites scattered across a disoriented, discombobulated Russian Federation. Security was so insufficient at some of Russia's nuclear facilities at that time that stealing highly enriched uranium (HEU) was The U.S.S.R. had relied on the strong hand of the state and absolute control over society to deter theft of its nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union's dissolution thus created an international security problem without precedent: nuclear weapons and materials were being stored in installations that lacked adequate security, often located in highly unstable areas. The risk that insiders, or a combination of insiders and intruders, would steal former Soviet nuclear weapons and materials loomed large.
In And yet, the bottom line is clear: not a single former Soviet nuclear weapon has been found in another country or in an international arms bazaar. Were it not for the intense professionalism, patriotism, and devotion to duty of the vast majority of the nuclear scientists and workers in the former Soviet states, a genuine nuclear proliferation catastrophe would surely have occurred. This incredible result is testimony to the determined efforts of the Russian government, including, in particular, the "nuclear guardians" in its Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Atomic Energy, supported by U.S.
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Cooperative Threat Reduction
In December 1991, as the Soviet Union-the "Evil Empire," as Ronald Reagan rightly 
LESSONS LEARNED
At the end of this March, President Obama will go to Seoul to join Lee Myung-bak and 52 other heads of state for the second Nuclear Security Summit. That event offers an appropriate occasion for looking back on the remarkable accomplishments of the past two decades for lessons for the future. Lessons about assistance in denuclearization, about the unilateral elimination of nuclear weapons, and about bilateral and multilateral cooperation in securing nuclear weapons and materials can be applauded and adapted to assure that the record of zero nuclear explosions in cities over the past two decades is maintained for the decade ahead, and beyond.
Of these lessons, it is the denuclearization of fourteen former Soviet states that demonstrates most vividly how effective, ambitious nuclear diplomacy can and should be at a time when the international community struggles to prevent a meltdown of the global nuclear order undermined by the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran.
First, and most obviously, denuclearization of Ukraine demonstrates that persuading states to surrender their nuclear arsenals is very difficult, but not impossible. Nuclear weapons tend to be viewed as a state's surest security blanket. Thus, when Ukraine felt increasingly vulnerable to Russian revanchism and estranged from the U.S., this military asset was increasingly attractive. The challenge for Washington and Moscow was to convince Ukraine that surrendering its nuclear arsenal would be better for its security than the alternative.
In the case of Kiev, Washington's and Moscow's appeal was two-pronged. First, they declared that Ukraine's retention of its strategic arsenal was unacceptable, and they unwaveringly committed themselves to the arsenal's removal. 10 Second, they combined this commitment to denuclearization with economic, diplomatic, and security guarantees.
Ukraine had to make a decision: to relinquish its strategic arsenal, giving up a potential
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What Happened to the Soviet Superpower's Nuclear Arsenal? Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit nuclear deterrent but winning Washington's and Moscow's support and security, or to retain its strategic arsenal and almost certainly lose Washington's and Moscow's support and security. U.S. and Russian security was certainly threatened for every additional minute Ukraine retained its arsenal. However, Ukraine's economic and diplomatic interests were increasingly threatened for every minute they held onto the arsenal. This condition overshadowed the advantages the weapons provided to Ukrainian military security-and these advantages were also deteriorating as the weapons aged. Ukraine decided that surrendering its nuclear weapons was the best option. Though Ukraine would be less militarily secure as a non-nuclear nation, Kiev hoped that surrendering the arsenal would make it more economically, diplomatically, and politically secure.
The second lesson the post-Soviet denuclearization case provides is that a potential nuclear state can be more easily persuaded to denuclearize when its nuclear weapon status is ambiguous or undeveloped. Though Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were extreme case, because they woke up one morning in possession of nuclear arsenals, their cases are nonetheless instructive. None of the three republics had made a political or economical investment in developing nuclear weapons. Thus, they did not have established organizations invested in maintaining the arsenal or a reflexive aversion to eliminating the weapons.
The third lesson that the case of Ukraine provides is that it is important to be clear about what is and is not acceptable to a given state. The U.S. owes part of its success to the clarity of its commitment to remove nuclear weapons from Ukraine. Ukraine was never in any doubt that the U.S. would accept nothing less than complete removal of all nuclear weapons. This forced Ukraine to make an "all or nothing" decision about its strategic nuclear weapons.
The case of Ukraine also provides a fourth critical insight: the U. 
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TERRORISM
As the world's leading nuclear weapons states, the U.S. and Russia have a unique ability, and a unique responsibility, to lead in combatting the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The future of the global nuclear order will be determined to a large extent by whether Washington and Moscow agree on the diagnosis of the threat and jointly develop a strategy to combat it.
But the U.S. and Russia cannot undertake or sustain efforts to combat nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism bilaterally. Fortunately, they need not try. Today, all responsible nations share vital national interests in preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Each has sufficient reason to fear nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, whether they are Al Qaeda, terrorist groups in Russia's North Caucasus, or doomsday cult members. Each nation's best hope to achieve conditions essential for its own security requires serious cooperation with the others. The great powers are therefore ripe for mobilization for a new global concert, indeed a grand Global Alliance Against Nuclear
Terrorism.
Just as the U.S. government recognized the Soviet Union's dangerous legacy of tactical and strategic weapons and moved briskly to secure them, so all states with nuclear weapons should acknowledge this pressing threat to global security -a threat too large for one nation to tackle alone -and join this alliance.
The mission of the alliance should be to minimize the risk of nuclear terrorism by taking every action physically, technically, and diplomatically possible to keep nuclear weapons or materials locked away to a "gold standard" to prevent them from being acquired by Compliance should be certified by independent international audits and tests of security. Such audits should become an integral part of the international process for operationalizing the "gold standard" in order to fill in the undefined "effective,  Cessation of all production of new HEU and plutonium that could be used in weapons.
The presidents of the U.S. and Russia could announce the Global Alliance at the Seoul summit and invite leaders of other nations to join them before the next nuclear security summit in 2014. The two presidents must use all their powers of persuasion and refuse to accept no for an answer.
As noted above, while the Washington summit took a giant step forward in addressing threats of nuclear terrorism, it failed to take other steps required for success. The participants were not able to agree on a shared assessment of the nuclear terrorism threat or establish an operational baseline and criteria for protection of weapons-usable material. The commitments listed in the communiqué were often vague or weakened by loopholes. Moreover, as observed by its organizers, the Washington summit picked most of the "low hanging fruit."
To accelerate progress in enhancing nuclear security, the U.S., Russia and other members of the proposed Global Alliance should commit themselves to taking the following actions between the 2012 and 2014 nuclear security summits:
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What Happened to the Soviet Superpower's Nuclear Arsenal? Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit  Agreeing to declare all stockpiles of HEU and plutonium, limit further accumulation of such stockpiles, consolidate their storage facilities, and reduce these stockpiles as rapidly as practicable.
 Agreeing to end the civil use of HEU and to eliminate civil stocks of such material.
 Agreeing to eliminate particularly dangerous stocks of HEU or separated plutonium. For instance, the U.S. and Russia could expedite efforts to have research reactors modified to run on low-enriched uranium (LEU). Those reactors that cannot be converted to LEU must be closed.
 Agreeing that the nuclear-weapon-states that are signatories to NPT and any other states willing to join the new Global Alliance will formally commit to a fissile material production moratorium in a joint statement. This would be a political commitment and intended to add momentum to, not supplant, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
 Establishing national and regional fissile-material free zones. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan could lead by example.
 Establishing joint capabilities to collect and analyze intelligence on nuclear terrorist threats.
 Agreeing that countries will provide on-site armed guards for all sites with HEU or separated plutonium, with numbers, training, and equipment sufficient to protect the sites against plausible threats until off-site forces arrive.
 Committing to carry out regular and realistic tests of nuclear security systems' abilities to counter attacks by adversaries in which insiders and outsiders collude.
 Committing to participate in exchanges of nuclear security best practices, to establish implementing programs for those practices at nuclear sites, and to participate in and support World Institute for Nuclear Security and IAEA security work.
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What Happened to the Soviet Superpower's Nuclear Arsenal? Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit  Agreeing to implement the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, even before its entry into force.
While leading efforts to enhance nuclear security worldwide though implementation of these measures under the auspices of the proposed Global Alliance, the U.S. and Russia should also bear in mind that there are still almost 20,000 nuclear warheads in their combined arsenals, far beyond what either requires for robust deterrence, including extended deterrence guarantees to allies. Therefore, Washington and Moscow should carry out a fresh round of deep bilateral nuclear arms reductions while also working to draw other nuclear powers into the disarmament process.
Some non-nuclear-weapons states are dragging their feet on more ambitious initiatives to prevent nuclear terrorism, on grounds of frustration, arguing that the nuclear-weaponsstates have not lived up to their commitments under the NPT to pursue disarmament in good faith. Sharply reducing Cold War arsenals and devaluing nuclear weapons in international relations would partially address these states' grievances. Complete nuclear disarmament, however, is a long-term goal. The urgent challenge for all nations is to staunch the current bleeding of the international non-proliferation regime, and to bring the risk of nuclear terrorism, which would change our world forever, to the lowest level possible.
